RIYADH/MOGADISHU - Saudi Arabia is widening its security ambitions across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. But the timing raises a difficult question: is Riyadh taking on more problems than it can realistically control?
On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. The three governments presented it as a framework for collective deterrence, with an armed attack on one state to be treated as an attack on all three.
Days later, Saudi Arabia and 13 other countries confirmed the creation of a maritime coalition intended to protect freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Together, the two initiatives signal Riyadh’s intention to play a larger role in shaping the region’s security architecture.
The security environment, however, has hardly become more reassuring.
On August 20, the Houthis said they had carried out two drone attacks in Saudi Arabia’s Najran province, targeting Najran airport and an Aramco facility. Saudi authorities did not immediately confirm those claims. Four days later, the group claimed that it had struck a Saudi oil tanker west of Yanbu. A British maritime agency separately reported that a tanker had been hit by an unknown projectile and caught fire.
These incidents underline the continuing threat to Saudi-linked maritime traffic and the pressure that insecurity places on shipping, insurance and energy exports.
At the same time, Riyadh is deepening its involvement in Somalia. In February, Saudi Arabia and Somalia signed a memorandum of understanding on defence and military cooperation. The agreement was described as covering several areas of mutual interest and serving the strategic interests of both states.
That creates a complicated strategic picture.
Somalia continues to confront al-Shabaab despite years of military operations. Recent research by The Century Foundation has also documented ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, including reported smuggling and weapons networks connecting actors on both sides of the Red Sea.
Piracy has added another layer of risk. On August 20, armed men boarded the Sibu 1 tanker in the Gulf of Aden and diverted it towards Somalia, according to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre. The incident came amid a broader resurgence of piracy around the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean.
The result is a foreign-policy paradox. Riyadh is trying to become a security manager in a region where state rivalries, militant organizations, smuggling networks and maritime threats increasingly overlap across borders.
The kingdom’s expanding engagement with Mogadishu may also draw it more deeply into disputes concerning Somalia’s territorial integrity and Somaliland’s status. That does not mean Saudi Arabia’s strategy is destined to fail. It does mean that every new commitment creates another arena in which Riyadh’s capacity and credibility can be tested.
The Makkah pact and the maritime coalition are statements of intent. Their real value will depend on whether they can prevent attacks, protect shipping and translate diplomatic agreements into tangible security.
For now, that remains uncertain.
Saudi Arabia may be seeking to reshape the strategic balance around the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. But it is doing so while unresolved threats remain on its own maritime approaches. That is why its Somalia strategy deserves close scrutiny.